Interim Measures under the Arbitration Act, 1996 Section 9 and Section 17 (Scope and Case Law)

By R. Gopalakannan, Advocate (Supreme Court of India & High Court of Madras)

Introduction

In arbitration, parties often need urgent relief to protect their rights even before the final award is delivered. Partly like Order XXXVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Attachment Before Judgement. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) provides for interim measures by courts under Section 9 and by the arbitral tribunal under Section 17. Section 9 empowers courts to grant interim protection “before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the award but before it is enforced”, while Section 17 empowers the arbitrator(s) to grant similar interim relief “during the arbitral proceedings”, with the tribunal’s orders now enforceable as a court order. The 2015 amendments to the Act significantly impacted these provisions introducing a time limit to commence arbitration after a Section 9 order, restricting courts from entertaining Section 9 once a tribunal is appointed, and expanding the tribunal’s powers under Section 17 to be on par with the court.

This article explains when Section 9 and Section 17 applications can be filed and how interim relief works once an arbitrator is appointed under Section 11. We discuss whether a pending Section 9 application becomes infructuous due to the tribunal’s constitution, if parallel proceedings under Sections 9 and 17 are allowed, and whether a Section 9 court order must be re-obtained from the arbitrator under Section 17. Relevant judgments and the recent amendments are cited to clarify the current law.

Section 9 of the Arbitration Act: Interim Measures by Court: 

Section 9 allows a party to an arbitration agreement to approach the court for urgent interim relief. The provision (as amended in 2015) reads as follows:

Section 9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.

(1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court—

(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:

 (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

 (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

 (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein, and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;

 (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

 (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient,

and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.

(2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine.

(3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1) unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.

When can a Section 9 application be filed?

Section 9(1) makes clear that a party can apply for interim measures at three stages: 

(a) before the start of the arbitration, 

(b) during the ongoing arbitral proceedings, or 

(c) after the award is made but before it is enforced under Section 36.

The courts have affirmed this wide time frame. For instance, even before an arbitrator is appointed or arbitral proceedings formally commence (e.g. before issuing the notice under Section 21), the court can entertain a Section 9 petition. The Supreme Court in Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) and Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) held that an application under Section 9 is maintainable even prior to commencement of arbitration the absence of a pending arbitration is no bar, so long as the applicant manifests a clear intent to initiate arbitration. In other words, a party may seek court protection “before or during arbitral proceedings” as the statute says, and need not wait for the tribunal to be seized of the dispute. Likewise, Section 9 explicitly permits post-award interim relief (for example, securing assets while an award is pending enforcement) a feature broader than the UNCITRAL Model Law, which only allowed court intervention before or during arbitral proceedings .

Scope of relief under Section 9:

The types of interim measures that can be granted by a court under Section 9(1)(ii)(a), (e) range from preservation or custody of disputed assets, securing the amount in dispute (e.g. by bank guarantee or deposit), inspection of property or evidence, interim injunctions, appointment of receivers, and “such other interim measure” as the court deems just and convenient. Courts thus have wide latitude  similar to their powers in civil suits (Order 39 Rules 1, 2, Code of Civil Procedure) to protect the subject-matter of arbitration. For example, courts have used Section 9 to direct parties to disclose assets, issue attachment orders, or prevent the dissipation of property to safeguard the eventual award. Any order passed under Section 9 is appealable under Section 37(1)(b) of the Act.

Effect of 2015 Amendments on Section 9: The 2015 Amendment Act introduced sub-sections (2) and (3) to Section 9 to address two concerns in the pre-2015 regime:

• Section 9(2): 90-day limit to commence arbitration. If a court grants interim protection before the arbitral proceedings have started, the applicant must commence the arbitration within 90 days (or such further time as the court may allow) from the date of the court’s order . This provision ensures that a party doesn’t abuse Section 9 by securing relief and then dragging its feet on starting the actual arbitration. In line with this, courts have held that “a party who does not ultimately intend to refer the dispute to arbitration cannot be permitted to seek interim relief” the interim order is effectively conditional on timely initiation of the arbitral process. If arbitration is not commenced in 90 days, the Section 9 order may cease to operate or be vacated as per the court’s terms.
  
  
• Section 9(3): Switching to Section 17 after tribunal is constituted. Section 9(3) imposes a bar on courts entertaining Section 9 applications once an arbitral tribunal has been constituted, unless the court finds that circumstances exist which render the remedy under Section 17 (the tribunal’s powers) inefficacious. The intent behind this change was to reduce court intervention once the arbitral tribunal is in place, by empowering tribunals to grant effective interim relief themselves . In other words, after the arbitrator(s) are appointed, parties should ordinarily seek interim measures from the arbitrator under Section 17, rather than continue in court. The court will entertain a post-appointment Section 9 application only in exceptional cases where the tribunal cannot provide an efficacious remedy. For example, if relief is needed against a third party (who is not bound by the arbitration agreement) or if the arbitral tribunal is unable to act swiftly (say, during a hiatus or in an emergency), the court’s intervention may be justified as an exception. The overall principle is to avoid duplicative proceedings and let the arbitral process function autonomously once it begins.
  

Judicial interpretation of Section 9(3): 

The phrase “shall not entertain” in Section 9(3) has been clarified by the Supreme Court in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. (2021). The Court held that the bar of Section 9(3) does not apply if the Section 9 application was already “entertained and taken up for consideration” by the court before the tribunal’s constitution . If the court has substantially engaged with the Section 9 plea (for instance, if hearings were concluded or an order was reserved) prior to the tribunal being constituted, then the court can proceed to decide it the subsequent appointment of an arbitrator will not divest the court of jurisdiction in mid-stream . The test is whether the court “has applied its mind to some extent” before the tribunal’s formation . In Arcelor Mittal, since the commercial court had already heard arguments and reserved orders on the interim application before the arbitral tribunal was appointed, the Supreme Court allowed the court to pronounce its decision despite Section 9(3). However, if an application is filed but not heard at all (or not taken up meaningfully) when the arbitrator gets appointed, then Section 9(3) kicks in the court should refrain from proceeding, absent special inefficacious-remedy circumstances. This ruling strikes a balance: preventing new or delayed Section 9 interventions after arbitration commences, but not derailing court proceedings that were already at an advanced stage.

In summary, Section 9 remains a vital remedy for interim relief, especially pre-arbitration or in urgent situations. But after the 2015 amendments, its use is subject to important conditions: the party must initiate arbitration within 90 days of a pre-arbitral interim order, and once an arbitral tribunal is available, the court will generally cede jurisdiction to the tribunal for interim measures. As discussed next, Section 17 now empowers tribunals to grant equally potent interim relief, thereby reducing reliance on courts during the arbitral process.

Section 17 of the Arbitration Act: Interim Measures by Arbitral Tribunal:

Section 17 authorizes the arbitral tribunal to provide interim relief to parties during the arbitration proceedings. Prior to 2015, Section 17 was sparsely worded and arbitrators’ interim orders were not directly enforceable, which made parties prefer court orders under Section 9. The 2015 Amendment Act entirely substituted Section 17 to strengthen the tribunal’s powers, mirroring the language of Section 9. The provision now reads:

Section 17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal.

(1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings,***, apply to the arbitral tribunal –

(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:

 (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

 (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

 (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein, and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for obtaining full information or evidence;

 (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

 (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient,

and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for making orders as the court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.

(2) Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under Section 37, any order issued by the arbitral tribunal under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court.

When can a Section 17 application be filed?

By its terms, Section 17 relief is available “during the arbitral proceedings.” This means once the arbitral tribunal is constituted and functional, parties can approach the arbitrator(s) for interim measures. It covers the entire span of the arbitration from the tribunal’s formation until the final award. Notably, “during the arbitral proceedings” has been interpreted to include even Emergency Arbitrator proceedings in institutional arbitrations – for example, the Supreme Court in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. (2021) confirmed that an emergency award in an India-seated arbitration under SIAC Rules is enforceable as an interim order of the tribunal under Section 17(2) . However, after the final award is delivered, the tribunal becomes functus officio (its mandate terminates), so any further interim measure (post-award, pre-enforcement) would fall back to the court’s domain under Section 9. In essence, Section 17 picks up where Section 9 leaves off: once the arbitrators are in place, they can provide nearly all the relief that a court could, obviating the need to return to court in most cases.

Scope and enforceability of Section 17 orders:

The types of relief an arbitral tribunal may grant under Section 17(1)(ii)(a)–(e) are identical to those listed in Section 9(1). This includes securing amounts in dispute, preservation or inspection of property, interim injunctions, appointment of receivers, etc. The tribunal may also require the applicant to provide appropriate security for the interim measure (a power implicit in Section 17(1) and often exercised to balance equities). Crucially, Section 17(2) ensures that an interim order of the arbitrator “shall be deemed to be an order of the Court” and is enforceable as such . Prior to this amendment, if a party violated a tribunal’s interim order, the aggrieved party had to seek court assistance (for example, via contempt or by invoking Section 27) to enforce it. Now, an arbitrator’s interim order carries legal force directly, it can be executed under the Civil Procedure Code just like a court injunction or order. This reform was aimed at making tribunal-ordered relief as efficacious as court-ordered relief, encouraging parties to rely on arbitrators for interim protection. (An appeal from a tribunal’s interim order lies to the court under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act, similar to appeals from Section 9 orders.)

In summary, Section 17 (post-2015) places arbitral tribunals on near-equal footing with courts for granting interim measures. The Law Commission and Parliament consciously empowered tribunals to handle interim issues to the extent possible within the arbitration, thereby minimizing court interference. As the Delhi High Court observed, “there is no reason for the Court to continue to take up applications for interim relief once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted and is in seisin of the dispute…unless the remedy under Section 17 is ineffectual.” This naturally raises the question: what happens to Section 9 proceedings or orders once an arbitral tribunal is appointed? We address this interplay below, with reference to common scenarios and relevant rulings.

Interplay of Section 9 and Section 17 after Arbitrator’s Appointment

Once an arbitrator (or arbitral tribunal) is appointed under Section 11, the forum for interim measures is expected to shift from the court to the arbitral tribunal, barring exceptional situations. We discuss two practical scenarios:

(A) when a Section 9 application is pending (undecided) at the time the arbitrator is appointed, and

(B) when an interim order had already been granted by the court under Section 9 and an arbitrator is subsequently appointed.

We also examine what remedy the applicant has if no interim relief was granted by the court before the switch, and whether any parallel proceedings can continue.

A. Pending Section 9 Application when Tribunal is Constituted

It is not uncommon that a party moves the court for interim relief and, in parallel, initiates the process for appointment of an arbitrator. During this process, the court may not have decided the Section 9 application by the time an arbitrator is appointed (by the court or by the parties). In such a situation, what is the remedy for the applicant once the tribunal is in place?

According to Section 9(3), once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court should not continue to “entertain” the Section 9 petition, unless the court finds the remedy under Section 17 to be inefficacious. In most cases, courts have interpreted this to mean that the Section 9 application should now be pursued before the arbitral tribunal under Section 17. The pending court proceeding typically becomes infructuous or is disposed of, given that the arbitral forum is available to grant urgent relief.

The High Courts have evolved a consistent procedure to smoothly transition the interim relief request from the court to the tribunal: the court will dispose of the Section 9 application (without deciding it on merits) but grant the applicant liberty to approach the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 for the same interim measures. Often, the court explicitly directs that the pending Section 9 petition be treated as an application under Section 17 before the arbitrator, with the pleadings and documents filed in court deemed to be part of the Section 17 record. This avoids any need for the party to re-file or duplicate the entire interim relief application from scratch. For example:

• In B.E. Billimoria & Co. Ltd. v. Supertech Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2020), the parties consented to arbitration during the Section 9 hearing. The High Court, while appointing the arbitrator, disposed of the Section 9 application by referring it to the arbitrator as a Section 17 application for the arbitrator’s adjudication  .
  
  
• Similarly, in MX Media & Entertainment Pte. Ltd. v. Sapna (Delhi HC, 2021), an arbitrator was appointed by the court while a Section 9 petition was pending. The High Court then directed that the petition be treated as one under Section 17, since pleadings were complete, and it disposed of the court proceeding accordingly .

This approach is in line with a pro-arbitration policy, once the arbitral tribunal exists, it should decide all further interim relief questions. It also avoids parallel proceedings. The applicant cannot simultaneously press the same interim relief before the court and the arbitrator; that would be duplicative and contrary to the scheme of the Act. Indeed, pursuing both forums in parallel could lead to conflicting orders and would undermine the efficiency of arbitration. Courts have emphasized that after constitution of the tribunal, they will step back and let the arbitrator decide interim measures on merits .

Importantly, the court’s disposition of the Section 9 application in such cases is usually without prejudice to the merits of the interim relief claim. The arbitrator considers the Section 17 application afresh and can grant, deny, or modify the interim relief based on the facts and standard principles (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable harm, etc.). The court’s prior non-decision doesn’t affect the arbitrator’s powers. The only role the court plays is facilitating the transfer: if needed, it may extend any ad-interim protection for a short duration (a few weeks) to allow the party to promptly apply to the arbitrator, as explained in the next scenario.

To directly address the question: If during the pendency of a Section 9 application no interim order was passed by the court and an arbitrator has since been appointed, the applicant’s remedy is to move a Section 17 application before the arbitrator for interim measures. The pending Section 9 petition would ordinarily be withdrawn or disposed as infructuous by the court, since jurisdiction now properly lies with the tribunal. There is no automatic “infection” that nullifies the Section 9 application; rather, it is a conscious decision by the court to not entertain it further under Section 9(3). The applicant should not expect to keep litigating the interim relief simultaneously in court and before the arbitrator parallel proceedings are not permitted under the Act’s framework. The Supreme Court in Arcelor Mittal (2021) underscored that once a tribunal is constituted, the court should not take up for consideration or apply its mind to a Section 9 request, except in rare cases where the arbitral remedy is truly inefficacious . The prudent course is to promptly petition the arbitrator under Section 17. In fact, many High Court orders explicitly grant leave to the applicant to approach the arbitrator and even direct that the arbitrator decide the matter expeditiously. This ensures the party is not left remediless the venue of remedy has simply shifted from the courtroom to the arbitration forum.

B. Section 9 Interim Order in Place when Tribunal is Constituted

Now consider the scenario where the court did grant an interim order under Section 9 (say, an injunction or asset-freeze) and only thereafter is an arbitral tribunal appointed (either by the court under Section 11 or by the parties themselves). For example, a court might have issued an order preserving assets or restraining certain actions, and subsequently an arbitrator comes into existence. The questions that arise are:

1. Does the Section 9 order automatically lapse upon the tribunal’s appointment?
   
   
2. Does the applicant need to obtain the “same” order from the arbitrator under Section 17 again, or will the court’s Section 9 order continue to operate until the arbitration is over or the award enforced?

Under the law, a Section 9 order does not instantly extinguish once the tribunal is constituted. Both precedent and practice show that such orders continue to bind the parties for some time, but the arbitral tribunal is now empowered to review, extend, or vacate those interim measures. Two High Courts have explicitly observed that nothing in Section 9 limits the operation of an interim order “till appointment of the arbitrator only.” In Velugubanti Hari Babu v. P. Narasimha Rao (AP High Court, 2017), it was noted that courts are empowered to grant interim measures even during the arbitration, and that such measures can last till the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings and award . The Gujarat High Court in Kirtikumar F. Jain v. Valencia Corporation (2019) concurred, stating: “Section 9…does not limit the operation of any order passed by the court…till the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The order passed by a court under Section 9 would continue to remain in force till the arbitral proceedings come to an end.” These judgments underline that a properly granted Section 9 injunction or order doesn’t vanish the moment an arbitrator steps in.

However, in practice, courts have adopted a balanced approach to hand over control to the arbitral tribunal while preventing any gap in protection. The typical approach when a Section 9 order is in force and the tribunal gets constituted is: the court disposes of the Section 9 petition, but extends the interim order for a short period (e.g. 2–8 weeks) to allow the party to seek a Section 17 order from the arbitrator. The idea is to maintain continuity of protection so that the beneficiary of the interim relief is not left unprotected during the switchover to the tribunal, while making it clear that the future of that interim relief lies in the tribunal’s hands. Some illustrative cases from the Delhi High Court demonstrate this practice:

• IRB Ahmedabad Vadodara Super Express Tollway Pvt. Ltd. v. NHAI (2020): The Delhi High Court had passed interim orders restraining certain actions by NHAI while the Section 9 was pending. Once the arbitral tribunal was constituted, the petitioner agreed to apply under Section 17 within two weeks of the tribunal’s first meeting. The High Court disposed of the Section 9 petition and directed that its interim orders “shall remain in force until the decision of the arbitral tribunal on the Section 17 application.” In essence, the court’s protection continued seamlessly, but only until the arbitrator could hear and decide whether to continue or modify that protection.
  
  
• Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Sinnar Thermal Power Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2019): The court had granted an interim injunction (preventing encashment of a bank guarantee). After the arbitrator was appointed during the pendency of Section 9, the court permitted the petitioner to withdraw the Section 9 and move the tribunal under Section 17. It kept the interim order alive for 3 weeks from the date of the order disposing the Section 9 petition. This gave a window for the petitioner to approach the arbitrator for a fresh interim order; after 3 weeks, the court’s injunction would lapse unless the tribunal extended it.
  
  
• Vineet Bansal v. Golf Green Infra Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2021): The court had an interim order preventing cancellation of a real estate allotment. On appointing the arbitrator (by the same bench), the High Court disposed of the Section 9 and directed that its interim order shall continue for 8 weeks, noting that the claimant is free to approach the tribunal under Section 17 for continuation or modification of that order.
  
  
• Sterlite Technologies Ltd. v. Union of India (Delhi HC, 2020): The court had passed an interim “no coercive action” order against the government. After an arbitrator was appointed by a different bench, the High Court treated the Section 9 application as a Section 17 application before the tribunal and extended the court’s interim order for 8 weeks, subject to the arbitral tribunal’s power to extend or vacate it in the meantime.

From these examples, the pattern is clear: the Section 9 order does not automatically cease upon the tribunal’s appointment, but the court deliberately limits its own order’s lifespan and defers to the arbitrator. The arbitrator, once seized of the matter, can decide whether the interim measure should continue, be modified, or be dissolved. Essentially, the interim relief “migrates” to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. If the party still needs the relief, it should promptly present its case to the arbitrator. If the opposing party believes the relief should be vacated or varied, it can apply to the arbitrator for that. The tribunal’s order (under Section 17) would then replace the court’s order moving forward.

To answer the specific query: if a party obtained an interim order under Section 9 (for example, an injunction or security) and subsequently an arbitrator is appointed under Section 11, does the party have to obtain the same order under Section 17 again, or will the Section 9 order continue until execution of the award? In practice, the party should indeed move the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 for continuation of the interim relief, and courts usually facilitate this by keeping the Section 9 order alive only temporarily. The Section 9 order is not permanent by itself; it will typically expire after a set time (a few weeks or until the Section 17 application is decided) unless renewed or replaced by the arbitrator’s order. Legally, as noted by the High Courts, a Section 9 order could continue until the end of arbitration or until the award is rendered . But in current practice post-amendment, courts rarely make their interim orders co-extensive with the entire arbitration (unless perhaps the parties consent). Doing so would sideline the tribunal unnecessarily. Instead, courts prefer a “handover” approach: they ensure no gap in protection, but entrust the future of the interim measure to the arbitrator. The Delhi High Court’s practice has been to “extend the interim order… either till the Section 17 application is disposed of or for 3 to 8 weeks (subject to extension/vacation/modification by the arbitral tribunal)”. Thereafter, the tribunal’s decision governs the interim relief going forward (and any Section 17 order of the tribunal can itself be enforced in court if needed, per Section 17(2)).

Therefore, in practical terms, the Section 9 order will not simply continue unchanged until enforcement of the award. The party should secure a corresponding Section 17 order from the arbitrator if long-term interim relief is required through the arbitral proceedings. The arbitrator may very well maintain the status quo ordered by the court (especially if circumstances remain unchanged), or might modify it after hearing both sides. Since arbitral tribunals now have the same powers as courts to grant interim relief and their orders are enforceable as court orders, there is no procedural downside to re-applying under Section 17 and it is both the prudent and advised course.

It is worth noting one more safeguard: Section 9(3) does allow a court to entertain a Section 9 even after tribunal formation “if the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy under Section 17 efficacious.” Could an interim court order be allowed to run in parallel with a tribunal order (i.e. two simultaneous interim orders)? Generally no once the tribunal is in place, it should be the primary forum. However, if, for instance, the arbitral tribunal is unable to grant effective relief against a non-party to the arbitration (a scenario where the tribunal’s power is limited) or if urgent ex-parte relief is needed at a time the tribunal cannot immediately act, a party might still seek the court’s assistance under Section 9 as an exception . Such scenarios are rare and would need to be justified under the “inefficacious remedy” proviso in Section 9(3). The Supreme Court has indicated that given Section 17(1)’s broad powers and Section 17(2)’s enforceability, the situations where court intervention is needed after the tribunal’s constitution should be few and far between. In most cases, the arbitrator is fully capable of protecting the parties’ rights once appointed.

Conclusion

The interplay of Section 9 and Section 17 after the 2015 amendments is geared towards a seamless transition of interim jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal once it is constituted. Section 9 can be invoked before, during, or after arbitration, but if an arbitral tribunal is available, the court will usually decline to entertain the application and direct the parties to seek relief under Section 17. Notably, the validity of a Section 9 order is not inherently time-bound by the tribunal’s appointment – it can legally continue until the end of the dispute yet courts typically limit such orders’ duration and defer to the tribunal to avoid concurrent authority over interim measures. The applicant need not fear losing protection in the handover; mechanisms exist (short grace periods, treating the court application as a Section 17 request, expedited hearings by the tribunal) to prevent any vacuum in interim relief. But ultimately, once the arbitrator is in place, it is the Section 17 application that becomes the primary recourse for ongoing interim measures.

The current law, bolstered by judicial decisions, ensures that arbitral tribunals are sufficiently empowered and that court intervention is available only as a supportive measure, not a competing one. The courts have laid down a supportive jurisprudence from Sundaram Finance and Ashok Traders to Arcelor Mittal that upholds both the necessity of interim measures and the autonomy of arbitral proceedings. With the 2015 amendments and these judicial clarifications, the arbitration regime now provides a clearer and more efficient path for interim protection, ensuring that a party’s rights can be safeguarded without derailing the arbitration process.

In practice, parties and practitioners should approach Section 9 and Section 17 strategically: use Section 9 for urgent pre-arbitration relief or in situations where tribunal help is not accessible, but be prepared to continue the fight for interim relief before the arbitral tribunal once it is constituted. The goal is to protect rights effectively while respecting the tribunal’s role. The amendments have largely achieved a balance empowering arbitrators to grant enforceable interim orders, while still permitting limited court assistance in extraordinary situations thereby reinforcing the Arbitration Act’s ethos of minimal court intervention and maximum arbitral efficacy.

References (Key Cases & Provisions)

1. Section 9 shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) thereof by s. 5, Act 3 of 2016 (w.e.f. 23-10-2015).
2. Ins. by s. 5, ibid. (w.e.f. 23-10-2015)
3. Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004)
4. Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999)
5. Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. (2021)
6. Subs. by Act 3 of 2016, s. 10, for section 17 (w.e.f. 23-10-2015).
7. " The words and figures "or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36" omitted by Act 33 of 2019, s. 4 (w.e.f. 30-8-201
8. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. (2021)
9. B.E. Billimoria & Co. Ltd. V. Supertech Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2020).
10. Similarly, in MX Media & Entertainment Pte. Ltd. v. Sapna (Delhi HC, 2021).
11. Velugubanti Hari Babu v. P. Narasimha Rao (AP High Court, 2017).
12. Kirtikumar F. Jain v. Valencia Corporation (2019).
13. IRB Ahmedabad Vadodara Super Express Tollway Pvt. Ltd. v. NHAI (2020)
14. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Sinnar Thermal Power Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2019)
15. Vineet Bansal v. Golf Green Infra Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi HC, 2021)
16. Sterlite Technologies Ltd. v. Union of India (Delhi HC, 2020).